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Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices
http://hdl.handle.net/10061/0002000473
http://hdl.handle.net/10061/000200047369239b75-e532-4196-aab9-13151b53a03d
| アイテムタイプ | 学術雑誌論文 / Journal Article(1) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2024-06-18 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | Echo TEMPEST: EM Information Leakage Induced by IEMI for Electronic Devices | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | Eavesdrop | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | electromagnetic emanations | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | electromagnetic information leakage | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | hardware security | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | information security | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | intentional electromagnetic interference | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | TEMPEST | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||||
| アクセス権 | ||||||||
| アクセス権 | open access | |||||||
| 著者 |
鍛治, 秀伍
× 鍛治, 秀伍× 藤本, 大介× Kinugawa, Masahiro
× 林, 優一 |
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| 抄録 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||
| 内容記述 | Electromagnetic (EM) information leakage encourages attacks, wherein the attackers passively capture and analyze EM waves that are unintentionally generated by devices. Generally, devices with weak EM emission intensities are not targeted. However, even these devices would be subject to attacks if it becomes possible to actively sense the electrical changes that occur within them when information is processed. This article demonstrates the feasibility of the information leakage threat induced by the active sensing of input impedance changes in the input/output (I/O) circuit of an integrated circuit (IC). Specifically, the changes in the input impedance when information was transmitted from the IC, were measured by irradiating the EM waves from outside the target device. This article labels the threat as Echo TEMPEST. The experiment validated Echo TEMPEST with an evaluation board that simulated the I/O circuit of the IC, UART modules, and USB keyboards. It was also demonstrated that attackers could control the distance (obtained information from the target device), depending on the intensity of the irradiated EM waves. Furthermore, we discussed countermeasure methods focusing on the conditions for executing Echo TEMPEST. | |||||||
| 書誌情報 |
en : IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility 巻 65, 号 3, p. 655-666, 発行日 2023-04-03 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||
| 出版者 | IEEE | |||||||
| ISSN | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | EISSN | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1558-187X | |||||||
| 出版者版DOI | ||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isReplacedBy | |||||||
| 識別子タイプ | DOI | |||||||
| 関連識別子 | https://doi.org/10.1109/TEMC.2023.3252636 | |||||||
| 出版者版URI | ||||||||
| 関連タイプ | isReplacedBy | |||||||
| 識別子タイプ | URI | |||||||
| 関連識別子 | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10091474 | |||||||
| 権利 | ||||||||
| 権利情報Resource | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |||||||
| 権利情報 | IEEE is not the copyright holder of this material. Please follow the instructions via https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ to obtain full-text articles and stipulations in the API documentation. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||
| 出版タイプ | NA | |||||||
